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THE GHETTO LAWYERt
JAMES J. GRAHAM *
T HE RECENT CONTROVERSY in New York City I over the
proper formula for dispensing free legal services to indigents
under the Economic Opportunity Act' reflects a more fundamental
misconception of the role of the lawyer, generally, in modern America.
Those who advocate strict adherence to the hallowed Canons of Ethics
t This article originally appeared in revised form in The Commonweal Maga-
zine, issue of November 17, 1967. It is adapted from a forthcoming book to
be published by Random House, Inc.
* B.A., Fordham College; LL.B., St. John's Law School; Ass't Prof. of Law,
New York University School of Law.
1 Negotiations leading to the establishment of a city-wide legal services program
commenced in early 1966 in New York City among anti-poverty officials of the
City administration, and representatives of the Office of Economic Opportunity,
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and of the public-at-large.
The sessions culminated in a comprehensive proposal for the establishment of
eight incorporated neighborhood legal offices employing, inter alia, approxi-
mately one hundred attorneys. The certificate of incorporation for the city
wide umbrella corporation and the underlying master plan itself were approved
by the Appellate Division, First Department, of the State Supreme Court
in November, 1967.
Though all of the negotiators were attorneys and none officially represented
the poor communities, the final agreement was approved by the New York
City Council Against Poverty prior to submission to the court. The Council
includes delegates designated by residents of the poverty areas.
The resolution, inter alia, of the following issues largely contributed to the
rejection of the original proposal by the court and to the considerable delay
prior to final approval (see text infra):
1. the role of law students and lay advocates in the legal services programs;
2. domination of the board of directors of the parent corporation and of
its neighborhood components by either lawyers or laymen;
3. the precise nature of the "political" conduct to be prosdribed and "edu-
cational" activities the attorneys might engage in and the extent to
which the legal services attorneys might "reach out" to the community
for clients; and
4. the types of cases the attorneys might handle and whether the attorneys
would be permitted to engage in "group" representation.
278 Stat. 508, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964). In 1965, Title II, Section 2785(a) of
of the profession seem to be indulging
in the romantic notion that today the
successful practitioner, like "Honest Abe"
Lincoln or the hero of "Anatomy of
a Murder," ' earns his income by reading
the law far into the night, until he
finds that elusive case in point.
This image certainly is out of focus in
the light of current legal practice but it
probably never coincided with reality.
Lincoln, we know, went on to become
a politician and the presidential candi-
date of big businessmen. The late Perry
Miller in his brilliant volume, The Life of
the Mind in America,4 pointed out that
the profession has come a long way in
the last hundred years. Toward the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, lawyers
were still considered by rich and poor
alike as a rather grubby lot; the public
saw them as unlearned technicians who
charged fees that were highly dispropor-
tionate to the services rendered.
Said Miller, "despite their noble en-
deavours to make the Common Law ap-
pear a systematic wisdom, to invest it
with the halo of Blackstone, they could
never quite fumigate it of the smell of
the grubby. It had grown up by acci-
the Act was amended to implicity include
legal services among the Community Action
programs. "focused upon the needs of low-
income individuals and families." 79 Stat. 974
(1965). See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3509 (1965) for legislative history of the
Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1965.
3R. TRAVER, ANATOMY OF A MURDER (1958).
4 P. MILLER. THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN
AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR (1965).
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dent, out of low contention. To shed
upon it the light of the sublime was a
tricky enterprise." 5
According to Miller, David Dudley
Field and other leaders of the Bar man-
aged before 1900 to refurbish the image
by consciously identifying the best im-
pulses of the legal profession with the
American version of the Christian Way
of Life.
"[O]nce the Common Law could be
caught up into the superior effulgence of
natural law, of the law of nations, then
it also could be covered by the canopy
of Christianity. By this maneuver the
profession could evade the charge of
hardheartedness." 6
Shysters and mediocre practitioners, of
course, would continue to be part of the
legal community but, in terms of influ-
ence, always on its outer edges. An
Establishment, composed, as they say, of
the best people in government and in the
better firms, from that time to this has
dominated all meaningful expressions of
the organized bar.
Needless to say, such expressions in-
variably have been conservative in tone.
For example, those seeking an historical
origin for the dependency "trauma" that
afflicts generations of welfare recipients
need only look to a classic decision in
State ex rel. Griffith v. Osawkeel in 1875
in Kansas by Field's nephew, David
Brewer. Brewer held that though relief
of paupers was a Christian obligation
binding on the state, only the utterly des-
5Id. at 166.
6 Id.
1 14 Kan. 418 (1875).
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titute, i.e., the hopeless, could qualify.
In Osawkee, Brewer declared unconstitu-
tional an act of the Kansas legislature
authorizing townships to issue bonds for
the relief of drought-stricken farmers.
Such aid, he said, did not constitute a
valid public purpose because the farmers
who were only "temporarily embarrassed"
were not paupers in the traditional sense.A
For the state to assist all poor persons
would be to "equalize the property of its
citizens." The eligible person must not
only be in want but "unable to prevent
or remove such want"; he must not
only depend on society for sustenance
but "cannot do otherwise than thus de-
pend." 10
Spokesmen for the legal establishment
at the turn of the century, including
Brewer, who became a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court, invested
the judiciary with the protection of na-
tural law property rights as its divine
mission. Between 1899 and 1937 the
Court, in 159 cases, struck down state
regulatory legislation in the name of sub-
stantive due process. 1 The era is prob-
ably best characterized by the decision in
Lochner v. New York 12 in which the
Court declared as violative of the four-
teenth amendment a New York statute
which limited employment in bakeries to
8Id. at 421, 426.
9 Id. at 422.
10 Id.
1' See WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942); Gamer,
Justice Brewer and Substantive Due Process:
A Conservative Court Revisited, 18 VAND. L.
REV. 615 (1965).
12 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
sixty hours per week and ten hours per
day. Such a regulation, said the Justices,
unreasonably interfered with the freedom
to contract of both employer and em-
ployee!'' It was not until 1932 that the
patrician, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, no
radical himself, channeled a populist up-
heaval into a progressive stream of legis-
lative social reforms that has continued
to the present time despite the inter-
mittent opposition of misgivings of the
organized bar.
The CALS Controversy
Perhaps the most complete delineation
of the role of the practicing lawyer as a
non-involved, stabilizing influence in the
community appeared in a decision relat-
ing to the New York imbroglio in No-
vember, 1966, by the Appellate Division
of the State Supreme Court. The court
in Matter of Community Action For
Legal Services, Inc. (CALS) 14 with the
active encouragement of the city's bar
associations, "regrettably" rejected pro-
posals for legal services corporations to
be financed under the EOA. 15
There were admittedly technical de-
13 Id. at 57.
1 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779
(1st Dep't 1966).
I: Section 280 of the Penal Law (now Section
495 of the Judiciary Law) which prohibits
corporations and voluntary associations from
practicing law also provides:
5. This section shall not apply to . . . or-
ganizations organized for benevolent or char-
itable purposes, or for the purpose of assist-
ing persons without means in the pursuit of
any civil remedy, whose existence, organiza-
tion or incorporation may be approved by
the appellate division of the supreme court
of the department in which the principal
office of such corporation or voluntary as-
sociation may be located.
ficiencies in the papers submitted for
approval; for example, the court found
that the petitions did not unequivocally
prohibit the lawyers for the poor from
engaging in what the court described as
"political, lobbying and propagandistic
activity." 16 But the court in CALS ex-
pressed disapproval in large part because
the operating schema called for "indis-
criminate mingling of social goals and
legitimate legal practice." 17 Said the
court, "[I]t would be one thing to allow
neighborhood law offices to handle poor
men's credit unions. It would be quite
another thing to have them handle, advise
and represent political factions or organi-
zations of social and economic protest
however worthy." Is
The Appellate Division also echoed the
assurances of the bar associations that its
principal concern was to make certain the
poor would receive the best available
legal services.' 9 Consequently, the court
ordered the city to promptly resubmit
corrected petitions; but, since the subse-
quent failure of the city and Office of
Economic Opportunity officials and rep-
resentatives of the Bar to reach agree-
ment on new submissions had cost the
poor ten thousand dollars per day, or
16 Matter of Community Action for Legal
Services, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274
N.Y.S.2d 779 (lst Dep't 1966).
1' Id. at 362, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
13 Id. at 363, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
"-Id. at 355-56, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 779. The As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New
York moved the court to restrict OEO-funded
legal services to the Legal Aid Society
for a two or three-year period until the local
anti-poverty structures in the poor communities
could become better established.
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three million dollars for the period be-
tween the two decisions and almost an-
other million for the prior months in
1966, in federal monies, they probably
have a right to question the sincerity of
all the protagonists.
Considering the seriousness of the issue,
the complexity of the proposal and the
fact that the Office of Economic Oppor-
tunity had advised the court that restrict-
ing operations to Legal Aid agencies
would terminate federal funding, it was
curious that the court, prior to issuing its
decision, did not heed the request of the
OEO and City officials for a hearing or
informal conference to clarify matters.
The action of the First Department in
Matter of CALS must have seemed even
more puzzling to any layman 20 cognizant
of the fact that the Appellate Division of
the Second Department in Brooklyn had
approved the Nassau County program2 1
in routine fashion on June 13, 1966.
More important to the future course of
legal services in the largest city of the
nation, to this day no one seems to know
precisely what conduct the judges intend-
ed to proscribe. Were rent strikers or
those arrested for "sitting-in" at welfare
centers to be denied representation?
Judge Raymond Pace Alexander of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in
20 However, one layman who was impressed by
the decision wrote, "Considering how busy
these judges are, it was an astonishingly well-
informed opinion." M. MAYER, THE LAW-
YERs 300 (1967).
21 Nassau County Law Services Committee,
Inc. whose former Executive Director, John
De Witt Gregory, is now General Counsel to
CALS.
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a decision dated May 10, 1967,22 reject-
ing an attack on that city's legal services
program, suggested that the New York
court in Matter of CALS took a "nar-
row view of the law." 23 According to
Judge Alexander, "no acceptable juris-
prudence can fail to recognize that 'legal'
rights have an intimate relation to social
and economic justice." 24
The New York court in Matter of
CALS and the City Bar Association were
concerned inter alia that the "educative"
features of the OEO programs25 might in-
volve solicitation of clients and the stir-
ring-up of litigation, 26 but Congress saw
this aspect as an essential ingredient of
a legal services program designed to al-
leviate poverty. 2 The tone of the deci-
sion suggested that the court believed it
had a sacred trust to protect an attorney-
client relationship that is incompatible
both with the legal needs of the poor and
with much of present-day practice. For
example, the OEO itself takes care to
22 Community Legal Services, Inc. (apparently
unreported).
2. Id. at 40.
21Id. at 41.
25 'To sponsor education and research in the
areas of procedural and substantive law which
affect the causes and problems of poverty . . .
to finance programs to teach the poor and
those who work with the poor to recognize
problems which can be resolved best by the law
and lawyers." OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPOR-
TUNITY, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SERVICES PRO-
GRAMS 2 (1966) (hereinafter cited as GUIDE-
LINES).
26 Prohibited by Canons 27 and 28 of the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETmCS.
27 "The Committee feels that authorizing legal
services for the poor is an effective way of
opening exits from poverty ...
prohibit attorneys employed in its pro-
grams from maintaining a private prac-
tice;2 8 the same cannot be said of all the
prosecutors' offices around the country.
If the court's narrow view of the role
of the ghetto lawyer (another double
standard?) prevents him from engaging in
traditional "non-legal" functions per-
formed by attorneys representing large
corporations, labor unions and landlords,
clearly indigents will be deprived of the
type of representation presently available
to the affluent.
For example, in every firm there are
attorneys who prepare pleadings, try
cases, research the law, and there are
others who spend most of their time dis-
cussing strategy with clients, mediating on
their behalf with legislators and govern-
ment agencies, and negotiating with op-
position attorneys. While engaged in the
latter type of activity, the attorney often
wears several hats. There is sometimes a
thin line between advice and direction,
especially when the attorney also happens
to own some stock in the client corpo-
ration.
Today, men who once served in high
government office are partners in the
most respectable Wall Street firms. It
"An essential ingredient . . . is an educational
effort to apprise eligible people of their rights
and responsibilities. . . . Indeed, the broader
the range of public information activities con-
cerning the availability of legal services and
the recognition of the legal problems that
confront the poor every day, the greater the
benefits of the program." Economic Opportun-
ity Amendments of 1966 P.L. 89-794, House
Report No. 1568, 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4285-86 (1966).
28 GUIDELINES 31.
would be foolish to suppose that their
impressive earnings derive from an ability
to educate clients on the fine points of
the anti-trust laws.
While it is true that success in the
public eye attaches to successful litigators
like F. Lee Bailey, in terms of financial
remuneration most of the high earners in
the profession work on Wall Street, never
appear in court, and are unknown to the
public at large. But whether a man
counsels corporations, labor unions or
felony defendants, by any standard, suc-
cess follows him who regularly achieves
satisfactory bargains for his client at the
least possible cost. An attorney who had
worked as house counsel for a large
manufacturer told me once that the firm
made him an officer because he gave
valuable advice while playing down his
legal status. "I don't write complex
memoranda," he said, "I simply send
them a note expressing my opinion."
In this light, therefore, the concern of
the courts and the bar associations for
the integrity of ghetto practice is, at best,
unwarranted and misplaced.
Not too long ago, at the request of
a priest in Brownsville, Brooklyn, I found
myself addressing over one hundred Puer-
to Rican factory workers out on a wild-
cat strike. They were protesting an almost
unbelievable "sweetheart" contract be-
tween their employer and bargaining rep-
resentative that, among other omissions,
did not take cognizance of an increase in
the state minimum wage. Most of the
strikers, incidentally, were eligible for
welfare supplements but had been too
proud to apply.
Technically, being an "officer of the
court," as lawyers describe themselves, I
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suppose I should have told the group
their strike was illegal, and fled the scene
with all professional aplomb. Instead, I
remained to say that while the workers
risked being discharged from employment,
as a practical, non-legal matter their col-
lective strength might force the employer
to capitulate to their just demands.
Unethical? Perhaps; but I had in mind
those management attorneys from highly
respectable firms in New York, Chicago,
Atlanta and New Orleans who have
amassed fortunes by unlawfully teaching
employers how to break labor unions
without getting caught. My ethical sense
had also been dulled by the sight of too
many upright attorneys parading well-




practice in the ghetto does call for a
certain amount of seemingly unorthodox
activity. Eight students sponsored by the
Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, who worked during the summer
of 1966 in slum areas in Brownsville and
East New York, did not learn much
about drafting complaints but at the end
they concluded the experience had made
them better human beings. The students
visited slum tenements to encourage the
formation of tenants' associations and
guided rent strikers to the housing court.
(One who helped a tenant file a criminal
complaint against his landlord heard him-
self denounced as a "communist" by a
clerk of the court.) Most often, how-
ever, the future lawyers simply hounded
welfare caseworkers by telephone on be-
half of aggrieved recipients, in storefronts
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operated by Christians and Jews United
for Social Action (CUSA), a local com-
munity action organization.
These white students, two of them
women, also attended evening meetings,
went on bus outings with their "clients"
and by accepting invitations to parties in
the community effectively showed that the
concept of "black power," at least at the
grass-roots level, does not exclude all out-
siders.
There is some reason to believe that
law students, being "technicians," are
more readily accepted than other under-
graduates by the leadership of poor com-
munities. Because they are able, instanter,
to play a defined role, they are not looked
upon either as potential threats or as
upper middle or middle class white "mis-
sionaries." The nature of ghetto practice
is such that students may utilize their
skills to service poor clients in certain
problem areas, including welfare, more
efficiently and economically than lawyers.
Needless to say, the quasi-legal experi-
ence available to law students in the
racial ghettos is infinitely more satisfy-
ing to them than opening windows and
running errands in a large law firm. The
attitudes they take with them into their
later careers, wherever, can only be of
benefit to the larger society.
The OEO programs also provide a
pragmatic and responsible outlet for the
troubled idealism of this generation of
students to which the law schools only
recently have begun to cater.
Neighborhood Emphasis
William Stringfellow demonstrated in
My People Is the Enemy that it is possi-
ble for a lawyer to maintain his pro-
fessional poise while dispensing legal ad-
vice on a Harlem street corner.
Stringfellow also anticipated the legal
services component of the War Against
Poverty with his low-keyed approach to
the practice of law in the ghetto. Moti-
vated by his Christian commitment, he
moved quietly into a slum neighborhood
in East Harlem and waited for the other
residents to adjust to seeing him around.
Stringfellow eventually won the trust of
the community because, unlike most
visitors to the ghetto, he did not come
on strong, had something to offer and
evidently planned to stay awhile.
For the same reasons, the theoreticians
of the Economic Opportunity Act linked
the new legal services operations to com-
munity action programs and emphasized
their neighborhood aspect.2 9  OEO Di-
rector Sargent Shriver has characterized
legal services as one of the crucial com-
ponents of any broad and effective pro-
gram for remedying ghetto conditions.3 0
The theory is that the federal monies
will best be spent not by providing coun-
sel in the traditional, colonial manner
but by giving the poor legal strength
with which they can identify. A practi-
tioner in a Brooklyn storefront who looks
to Manhattan for his instructions and
leaves his work area by nightfall will
not satisfy the leaders of the poor or
help solve their basic problems.
These problems, indeed, are enor-
mous and almost all of them have legal
overtones. In a speech in 1964, then
29 See Legal Services and The War On Pov-
erty, 13 CATHOLIC LAW. 272, 288 (1967).
39Shriver, The Availability of Legal Services,
51 A.B.A.J. 1064 (1965).
Attorney General Robert Kennedy aptly
described poverty as a "state of helpless-
ness-of inability to cope with the con-
ditions of existence in our complex so-
ciety." 31  This impotence, which dimin-
ishes in intensity as a citizen ascends
the economic ladder, often manifests it-
self in a mild paranoia which sees labor
unions, Con Edison, the police and other
power groups in active coalition against
his interests.
The cogent comment has been made
that "[p] overty is more than an economic
status-it is a state of mind. ' 32  Judge
Alexander, in approving the Philadelphia
program, noted that one major accom-
plishment of legal services will be in-
stilling in the slum dweller greater re-
spect for and confidence in the American
police. "With the greater protection of
the American poor [person] against all
the evils under which he has suffered in
the abuse of the legal process, both civil
and criminal, the 'law' (as the police
are known to him) will no longer be
his enemy."38
The delay, then, in utilizing available
funds for one of the few anti-poverty
programs considered non-controversial by
the Congress is both tragic and ironic. 34
s' Cited in Paulsen, The Expanding Horizons
of Legal Services-I, 67 W. VA. L. REV. 179,
185 (1965).
32 Legal Services and the War on Poverty, 13
CATHOLIc LAW. 272, 296 (1967).
3 Supra note 22.
3 "In fiscal year 1967, the Committee wishes
to have no less than $22 million expended
upon projects devoted to putting the force of
legal advocacy behind those low-income per-
sons who are unable to afford the services
of a private attorney." 3 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4285 (1966).
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But, while over three hundred other
cities or communities to date have com-
menced legal services operations, it is
only fair to say that the success or fail-
ure of the neighborhood concept in a
city as large as New York will have a
decisive impact on existing and future
programs across the country.
It is also possible to concede the good
faith of those who object to any meaning-
ful local participation in such programs
and still be persuaded that their fears
stem from a lack of personal familiarity
with life in the racial ghettos. In addi-
tion, there are deep-seated prejudices
against the poor as clients which give
rise to patronizing, "I know what's best
for you" attitudes. Most lawyers, in
fact, are keenly aware that the malaise
of poverty tends to infect him who comes
too close to it.
Small practitioners who handle crimi-
nal cases have made an art out of not
getting to know their clients. For many,
the beauty of a lower court criminal
practice is that a plea of guilty by the
defendant, a most frequent occurrence,
usually signals the end of the trial at-
torney's case and all contact with his
client. But, obviously, a lawyer who
wants to lend his skills both to the im-
mediate problem and to the eradication
of the root causes of the criminal acti-
vity and civil disorders must be willing
to suffer the incoherence, delusions, the
smells and the dirty streets that are in-
digenous to storefront practice.
Even the liberals among the Wall
Street partisans, who can afford to be
altruistic about legal activities that do not
threaten their incomes, are probably un-
DEFAMATION
aware that they approach the subject
from an inherently conservative position
that derives from close daily association
with the corporate personalities they
represent. Because the overwhelming
number of successful and influential prac-
titioners go where the big money is, it is
unthinkable that central control, no mat-
ter how responsible or well intentioned
over neighborhood legal services should
emanate from the financial district in any
city. Noblesse oblige, in this area at
least, arrives about ten years too late.
Many local practitioners, on the other
hand, admittedly do see the advent of
OEO-financed lawyers both as competi-
tors and as potential threats to the equa-
nimity of their major clients, the land-
lords and the small banks. They are,
of course, correct on the second count
but it is only too evident that few at-
torneys make a living representing dis-
possessed tenants or testing, in court, the
rights of welfare recipients to privacy or
adequate budget allowances. Presuma-
bly, these cases will predominate under
the new programs.
Much has been said about the unex-
pectedly high proportion of "marital"
suits in the legal services caseloads but
if the Nassau and Newark experience is
representative, even in this area much
of the child support, custody and pater-
nity litigation is sponsored by and on be-
half of local welfare departments. There
is also some tentative evidence that at
least the Newark program (Newark Le-
gal Services Project) has generated a
fair amount of fee-producing litigation
for general practitioners.
The vested interest point of view, in-
cidentally, appeared in a bill that passed
during the last session of the New York
State Assembly by a startling vote of
ninety to eighteen. The legislation would
have prevented third-year law students,
under the guidance of senior attorneys in
legal services corporations, from appear-
ing with clients in minor court cases or
at welfare hearings. Credit for defeating
the bill in the upper chamber is owing
to responsible officials of the Wall Street-
oriented City Bar Association and Dean
Robert McKay and other faculty mem-
bers of the New York University School
of Law.
But, paradoxically, the possibility that
the legal arm of the War Against Pov-
erty may accomplish radical reforms on
behalf of the poor in the long run will
also redound to the advantage of that
sector of the profession that services a
middle-class clientele. Just as successful
protest demonstrations organized in the
ghetto neighborhoods have encouraged
small homeowners to form block associa-
tions in order to more effectively agitate
for better municipal services, so too will
legal successes in indigent cases enhance
the image of the lawyer outside the
slums. Significantly, even the American
Bar Association, which only a few years
ago denounced the British system for
free legal aid as "socialistic, '8 5 has adopt-
ed a similar point of view.
Hopefully, the advent of a neighbor-
hood-based legal services system will aid
(Continued on page 87)
35 See Voorhees, The OEO Legal Services Pro-





in revamping outmoded legal procedures
generally and in encouraging more wide-
spread use of group practice for those
well above the poverty line but too poor
to afford effective and continuing legal
representation."6
Today, it is generally conceded that
though indigents cannot even begin to
think about hiring a lawyer, middle-in-
come people in the big cities, especially,
will also think twice before doing so.
36 Paulsen, The Expanding Horizons of Legal




an affirmative decision that it also be
affirmed on appeal except in those cases
where the facts in no way support the
decision of the court of first instance or
where there has been a gross violation of
procedural law. They argue that the
court of first instance is better prepared
to grant a just decision because it has
had all the parties before it. And ulti-
mately, who is to say that three prudent
men in Pittsburgh are more or less wise
than three prudent men in Chicago, New
York or San Francisco in reaching a
The cost of an urban lawyer's services,
except for real estate closings where
cash in hand or a new home tend to
give a glow to the transaction, or personal
injury litigation, where almost everyone
recovers, for most citizens is usually
disproportionate to the results achieved,
and, therefore, a luxury item.
The fault in most cases is not attribu-
table to the lawyer himself. He has no
choice but to charge for the many hours
he spends in a lower court, not to speak
of the discourtesies he endures, waiting
for a calendar call on a single claim
worth one or two thousand dollars. The
fault, instead, lies with an archaic and
rigid system which, in practice, imposes
a sacrosanct attorney-client relationship
on all except the truly affluent.
decision on the validity of a marriage. If
we are not prepared to change Canon
1014 in favor of the person, and if we
cannot change Pur system of appeals,
perhaps this suggestion can be the first
step in giving a new and greater hope to
those who seek the justice of the
ecclesiastical tribunal.
(6) Finally, unlike the common law
with which the lay advocate is familiar,
they find our law too strict and rigid.
There is little room for creativity. Like
the common law, they feel that canon law
ought to live and breathe and realistically
reflect the needs of our people within the
context of their existential experience.
